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Abstract Perceptions of the United States in European public opinion greatly
improved around 2008, while perceptions of China simultaneously deteriorated. The
Transatlantic and Sino-European relationships stem from radically different historical
contexts. Yet could the image of China and the image of the U.S. be related in the eyes
of Europeans? This paper examines whether attitudes toward China have contributed to
determining attitudes toward the U.S. in Europe by analyzing data from the Transatlantic Trends survey taken in 2010, a critical juncture in Europe’s relations with both the
U.S. and China. We investigate three hypotheses about this relation: the ‘‘yin and yank’’
or negative correlation (the more Europeans fear China, the more positive they become
about the U.S.; the more favorably Europeans view China, the more negatively they see
the U.S.); the ‘‘open vs. closed’’ or positive correlation (the more favorably Europeans
see China, the more favorably they see the U.S.; the more negatively they see China, the
more negatively they see the U.S.); and no relation (European attitudes toward China
and the U.S. are independent). To the question of whether anti-Chinese sentiment has
the potential for replacing anti-Americanism in Europe, our main conclusion is that
positively correlated attitudes toward the U.S. and China reveal a deep cleavage in
Europe between those who are ‘‘in’’ and those who are ‘‘out’’ of globalization.
Comparative European Politics (2017) 15, 577–603. doi:10.1057/s41295-016-0005-6;
published online 4 August 2016
Keywords: anti-Americanism; China; Europe; globalization; public opinion; United
States

The image of the United States in Europe reached a low point during the George W.
Bush administration. Anti-Americanism was rampant, especially in Western
Europe, where the biases were mostly based on a contemptuous critique of
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American hypocrisies and an existential fear of American hegemony and
ubiquitous power. The election of Barack Obama transformed this anti-American
vision almost overnight, and Europe quickly became the most ‘‘pro-American’’
continent, at least temporarily. What a difference a few years and a new leader
make. The approval rate of the U.S. president abroad is an important metric of
America’s foreign image. In 2008, about one-in-five Europeans polled approved of
how George W. Bush handled international policies. Just one year later, after the
election of Obama but before he could actually make his mark both domestically
and internationally, the presidential approval rate skyrocketed to 83% in the
European Union countries polled by Transatlantic Trends (German Marshall Fund,
2010). The Obama-bounce was especially marked in some of the most important
allies of the U.S.: the German public’s approval rate jumped from 12% to 92% and
in France it went from 11% to 88%. While somewhat declining, Obama’s approval
rates in Europe remained remarkably high at 78% in 2010 and 75% in 2011 (Nyiri,
2014).
This apparent conversion of Europe to a more positive disposition toward the
U.S. coincided with the ‘‘rise of the rest’’ (Zakaria, 2008), and notably the relative
decline of the U.S. and the dramatic economic ascent of China. The 2008 financial
crisis in the U.S. and the sovereign debt crisis that hit Europe in early 2010
consecrated the arrival of China as a major actor on the European scene. Chinese
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the European Union (EU) surged from
virtually nothing in 2008 to flows of 2 billion euros in 2010 and close to 20
billion euros by 2015 (Meunier, 2014; Hanemann and Huotari, 2016). Interestingly,
while Europeans warmed up to the U.S., many of them simultaneously cooled
down toward China. Indeed, at the turn of the decade, the top four countries in the
world with the most negative image of China were all in Western Europe (BBC
World Service Poll, 2011a, b). Even though the Transatlantic and Sino-European
relationships stem from radically different historical contexts, could the image of
China and the image of the U.S. be related in the eyes of Europeans?
This paper examines whether attitudes toward China have contributed to
determining attitudes toward the U.S. in Europe by analyzing data from the
Transatlantic Trends survey taken in 2010,1 a critical juncture in Europe’s relations
with both the U.S. and China.2 We test three hypotheses about this relation: the
‘‘zero-sum’’ or negative correlation (the more Europeans fear China, the more
positive they become about the U.S.; the more favorably Europeans view China,
the more negatively they see the U.S.); the ‘‘open vs. closed’’ or positive correlation
(the more favorably Europeans see China, the more favorably they see the U.S.; the
more negatively they see China, the more negatively they see the U.S.); and no
relation (European attitudes toward China and the U.S. are independent).
The main findings generally support the positive correlation hypothesis. Positive
attitudes toward China are accompanied by similar attitudes toward the U.S.
However, this is most pronounced in the case of negative sentiments. Where
578

 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1472-4790

Comparative European Politics Vol. 15, 4, 577–603

Public opinion in Europe toward the U.S. and China

European publics find the U.S. leadership on the global scene undesirable, they also
dislike China and see its rise as an economic threat more than an opportunity. The
results of the analysis suggest that rather than replacing the United States, China
may be joining it as yet another major global actor subject to hostile public opinion
from the ‘‘anti-hegemony’’ and ‘‘anti-globalization’’ camp in European countries.
The findings also point to a real line of cleavage in European public opinion
between those who fear economic and cultural openness and those who feel curious
and optimistic about globalization (Kriesi et al, 2012; Hall et al, 2014).
Few, if any, studies have looked at this question of whether anti-Americanism in
the 21st century is now influenced by attitudes toward China. Zixiao Yang and
David Zweig asked whether pro-American sentiments increased the likelihood of
being anti-Chinese, but we are not aware of any study asking the reverse question
(Yang and Zweig, 2009). Also, how the American public looks at China has been
studied in more detail than how Europeans do the same (Page and Xie, 2010 and
Pew, 2012).
As Jeffrey Legro and Peter Katzenstein remarked in their task force on the U.S.
standing in the world, American foreign policy seriously needs more gathering of
information and collection of data on how the U.S. is viewed abroad (American
Political Science Association, 2009). With this article, we hope to fill this gap by
providing the first systematic study of the impact of attitudes toward China on
attitudes toward the U.S. among the publics of its most important security allies in
Europe.
After presenting how China has become an actor in Europe and comparing the
reality of American and Chinese power today, the article introduces three
hypotheses about the potential role of European attitudes toward China as a
determinant of their attitudes toward the U.S. We then explore this relation by
analyzing data from the 2010 Transatlantic Trends survey. We conclude by asking
how transitory or permanent these changes are and by exploring some of the policy
implications of these results.

China as an Actor of Globalization in Europe
Until recently Europeans were either indifferent toward China or looked at its rise
with curiosity and even excitement. And yet in 2010 Europeans, especially in the
West, had among the most unfavorable attitudes toward China in the entire world.
What has changed is that China, although not a major global military actor and
certainly not one on the European continent, had suddenly become a visible
economic actor in Europe.
The role played by China on the European continent has been transformed in
recent years. In the mid-2000s, China was viewed with interest as one of the BRICS
and with surprise as an example of how capitalism and democracy were not
 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1472-4790
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necessarily going hand in hand. The Chinese economic boom was a source of
enormous opportunity for European companies, whether because of the potential
size of the Chinese market or because of the savings provided by outsourcing cheap
labor. European workers, especially those in low-skilled jobs and the manufacturing sector, saw China with fear as a source of unfair competition. European
consumers saw China as a source of cheap stuff, a central factor in driving down
the price of consumer goods. But if China was already a major economic power, it
was not yet a major actor on the European scene.
By 2010, the picture was markedly different. China has become an economic
actor on the European continent. This rise to actorness was precipitated by the
strategic push by the Chinese government to prompt its firms to ‘‘go out’’ and invest
abroad, by the 2008 financial crisis in the U.S., and by the 2010 sovereign debt
crisis in the Eurozone. As a result, European fears about the growing power of
China have increased dramatically (Meunier et al, 2014; Godement and ParelloPlesner, 2011). This continued fear of China’s increasing power is reflected in
European public opinion as well. Transatlantic Trends finds that the majority (65%)
of Europeans polled find China’s leadership in world affairs undesirable, on par
with the ‘‘undesirability’’ of Russia’s global leadership (68%) in 2014 (Transatlantic Trends, 2014).
With its ‘‘Go Out’’ policy edicted in 1999, the Chinese government encouraged
Chinese firms to develop operations overseas with the help of preferential longterm loans. The push for Chinese outward FDI started initially in countries that
could provide China with needed raw materials and natural resources, mostly in
developing countries in Africa and Latin America. By the end of the 2000 decade,
however, Chinese firms were actively investing through a multitude of greenfield
projects and mergers and acquisitions in Europe and the United States, where they
could obtain technology and know-how while diversifying their reserves, building
brands, and maximizing their profits. While China still had a very modest presence
in Europe in 2010, accounting for only 0.2% of all FDI stock that year, it has been
growing very rapidly and visibly, and Chinese investments are increasing at a faster
pace in Europe than they are in the U.S. (Hanemann, 2014).
This rise to Chinese actorness in Europe was precipitated by the U.S. financial
crisis of 2008, which dealt a blow to the status of the United States. First, because it
did originate in the U.S. and the main source of culpability lay mainly with
American actors, be they big banks or regulators (Meunier, 2013). Second, by
revealing and accelerating the extent of American debt, the crisis weakened the
ability of the U.S. to project its power. Finally, the coup de grace was given by
China stepping into purchase American debt, reinforcing the impression that the
center of gravity of international power had shifted toward the orient.
This article focuses on 2010, a watershed year for Sino-European relations. In
2010, China overtook Japan to become the world’s second largest economy
(Barboza, 2010). China also passed Germany as the world’s top exporter (Bradsher
580
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and Dempsey, 2010). The Copenhagen conference on climate change in December
2009 revealed to Europeans that it was now China, no longer the U.S., who was
now the main obstacle to an agreement and consecrated China as a major actor in
international negotiations. 2010 also saw several important state visits by Chinese
officials in Europe, including Hu Jintao’s pompous visit to France in November
2010.
More important than anything else, however, was the European sovereign debt
crisis in Europe which exploded in Greece in the spring of 2010 and then spread to
other European countries. The U.S. could be of no help since its own economy was
mired in debt (much of it owned by the Chinese). China used the opportunity
provided by the Greek turmoil to invest massively in the country, leasing, for
instance, commercial operation at the Port of Piraeus for 35 years, as well as
acquiring major stakes in distribution, telecommunications, and real estate,
providing welcome relief to Greece in the process (Faiola, 2010; Meunier,
2015). Ireland, next in line of the euro countries in crisis, was promised massive
investment from China to create a manufacturing hub in Athlone (Inman et al,
2010). When it was Spain’s turn to face its own debt crisis, China provided a
lifeline by investing in banking, tourism, real estate, and energy (Moya, 2011).
China similarly came to the rescue of Portugal through massive investments there.
This catapulted China as an essential actor in Europe.
Consequently, the power of China became an obsession in the European media in
2010. European magazines used menacing images of China and provocative titles
on their covers, such as The Economist’s ‘‘Facing Up to China’’ (The Economist,
2010), ‘‘Buying Up the World’’ (The Economist, 2010), and ‘‘The Dangers of a
Rising China’’ (The Economist, 2010), and France’s L’Express ‘‘How China
Invades Europe’’ (L’Express, 2010). The ‘‘yellow peril’’ of the 21st century became
one where greedy Chinese capitalists take over prominent and sensitive European
companies, steal and copy European technology, and destroy European manufacturing jobs while inundating the continent with potentially defective goods, all
produced while ignoring human rights.
As a result, Europeans were overestimating Chinese economic power and
underestimating European power. In reality, the EU was, and still is, the world’s
largest economic actor, whether measured in GDP, percentage of world trade, or
percentage of inward and outward foreign direct investment (both flows and
stocks). By contrast, Chinese investment in Europe was still very modest and
incommensurate with European investment in China: European companies invested
€5.3 billion in China in 2009, while China invested €0.3 billion in 2009. This is,
respectively, less than 3% and 1% of both sides’ total investment outflow
(European Commission, 2010).3 According to data provided by the European
Commission, the total U.S. investment in the EU is three times higher than in all of
Asia and the EU investment in the U.S. is around eight times the amount of EU
investment in India and China together (European Commission, 2013).
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But it is true that China’s role in Europe is changing, and European attitudes
toward China seem to be determined more by perceptions of the tangent and the
trajectory than by a snapshot of contemporary reality. Indeed, when asked who is
the leading economic power in the world today, Europeans in their majority started
to answer China over the U.S. in 2010 for the first time: 51% in Germany (vs. 18%
for the U.S.), 47% in France (vs. 41% for the U.S.), 44% in Britain (vs. 38% for the
U.S.) (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2010). Europeans had already determined that
China has become the main driver and the main beneficiary of globalization several
years before the Chinese economy, by some measures, actually made it to the top.
The trend-line of China becoming the dominant global power in the public eye,
while the U.S. is losing its status, does not seem to be showing signs of slowing
down. Nor is it solely contained in Europe. In 2008, 49% of the 20 countries in the
world surveyed by Pew considered the U.S. as the world’s leading economy and
only 19% considered China to be the same. By 2014, 31% of the people in the same
countries considered China as the world’s leading economy and percentage of those
considering the U.S. as the leading economy dropped to 40%. In 2014, half of the
populations in those 20 countries surveyed by Pew in 2008 thought that China will
replace or has already replaced the U.S. as the world’s superpower as opposed to
only 41% 6 years prior to that (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2014).

The Potential Impact of Attitudes Toward China on Attitudes
Toward the U.S.4
This article explores whether the actual and perceived rise of China is affecting
attitudes toward the United States in Europe. After all, anti-Americanism in Europe
was attributed in large part to American hegemony, including economic hegemony
(Chiozza, 2009; Holsti, 2008; Katzenstein and Keohane, 2007). If the U.S. has
indeed been dethroned from its economic pedestal by China, what will happen to
attitudes toward the U.S. in Europe as a result? We posit three hypotheses about the
impact of attitudes toward China on attitudes toward the U.S., grounding our
question broadly in the political, historical, and cultural contexts of public
sentiment in Europe. The surveys used in this paper reveal that the public is very
much aware of the value congruence between Europeans and Americans in general.
Seventy-one percent of the people in the European Union polled agree that the
United States and the European Union have enough common values to be able to
cooperate on international problems and 77% of the Americans also have the same
opinion. In contrast, only 30% of the EU respondents and 55% in the U.S. agree
that they share common values with China (Transatlantic Trends, 2010).
The three hypotheses reflect a diverse set of approaches for understanding how
European citizens may be interpreting the relative roles of the United States and China
in shaping the global commons. Each approach reflects distinctly an individual’s
582
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worldview about the leadership of the U.S. and the perception of China in the global
economy. The first, zero-sum ‘yin and yank’ approach yields the expectation of a
negative correlation, in which positive sentiment toward China is associated with a
negative view of the U.S. We contrast the ‘realist’ approach of the first hypothesis with
the second ‘globalization’ hypothesis that captures an individual’s broader orientation
toward the intense flows of goods, money, and people across the globe. Under this
hypothesis, we expect sentiments toward China and the U.S. to move largely in tandem
in the same direction, reflecting public opinion on these actors as leaders in the process
and trajectory of globalization. The third hypothesis of ‘no relation’ captures the view
that Europe’s relationship with the China and with the U.S. are separable, each the
subject of different relations of identity and the product of very different historical
contexts. Below we examine each hypothesis in turn.
Hypothesis 1:

The ‘‘yin and yank’’ or negative correlation hypothesis

According to this hypothesis, grounded in classical realist and neo-realist theory,
international power is treated as a ‘zero-sum’ game and states react to shifts in the
distribution of power by balancing against or bandwagoning with the rising power
(Waltz, 1979). By extension, one could expect individuals to react the same way in
their opinions toward the great powers, leading to a negative correlation between
attitudes toward China and toward the U.S. If individuals are mostly balancing
against the rising power in their attitudes, the more fearful Europeans become of
China (especially in the economic sphere), the more they minimize their antiAmericanism. Increases in anti-China sentiment lead to decreases in anti-American
sentiment. Anti-Chinese sentiments are becoming a substitute for anti-Americanism, resulting from similar causes and fulfilling similar functions. China is
increasingly seen as a regional, and soon to be global, hegemon, and Europeans
have to take sides, like they did during the Cold War, with anti-Soviet and antiAmerican sentiment inversely related, as shown by Pierangelo Isernia (Isernia,
2007). Conversely, if individuals are mostly ‘‘bandwagoning’’ with the rising
power in their attitudes and are abandoning the former hegemonic power which has
now lost its luster, it could be that the more favorably Europeans view China, the
more negatively they see the U.S.. In either case, according to this ‘‘zero sum’’
view, the rise in attitudes toward one power leads to a decrease in attitudes toward
the other.
Hypothesis 2:

The ‘‘globalization’’ or positive correlation hypothesis

This hypothesis, by contrast, does not assume that attitudes toward great powers
represent a fixed sum. On the contrary, these attitudes are positively correlated.
Increases in anti-China sentiment are paralleled by increases in anti-Americanism,
and increases in pro-Chinese sentiment are associated with increases in proAmerican sentiment. This could be because public opinion is just wary of any
hegemony, wherever it comes from. Both hegemons stand in their way, and the
 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1472-4790
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public does not distinguish one from the other. They are both seen as rivals instead
of alternatives to one another. Useful comparisons can also be made to the Cold
War era on how some Europeans viewed both the Soviet Union and the U.S. as
threats to their own country when tensions escalated in the mid-1960s, and as a
result were both anti-American and anti-Soviet (Isernia, 2007). Alternatively, it
could be that anti-China sentiments and anti-Americanism reflect a disposition to
worry about globalization and in general openness to the world – which could also
coexist with racism, anti-immigrant sentiment, and negative attitudes toward
European integration, as they coalesce in the platforms of far-right populist parties
in Europe.
Hypothesis 3:

The ‘‘independence’’ or absence of correlation hypothesis

Finally, it might be that attitudes toward China and the U.S. are unrelated, as
they are the product of very different sets of bilateral relations, each with its own
distinct political and historical contexts. This hypothesis captures the separability
and independence of European countries’ relations with the United States and with
China, in which anti-Americanism in Europe is qualitatively different from whether
Europeans also view China as an economic opportunity and threat. The United
States and Europe share a long history as members of the transatlantic community,
a security community with dependable and convergent expectations for peaceful
change (Deutsch et al 1957) and shared identities and values (Adler and Barnett,
1988). It is an enduring alliance of democracies, in which strong economic and
military ties bound the United States with Europe through the Marshall Plan and
NATO, and in the process the United States also supported European integration.
Anti-American in this context is thus animosity among ‘friends’ and reflects the
variation in European public opinion that is part of everyday transatlantic relations.
Europe’s relations with China have no similar parallel and have followed a very
different path. Indeed, European relations with China, and with Asia more broadly,
are marked more by a tempestuous colonial past and general uncertainty regarding
the ‘rise of China’ in the contemporary period. China’s ‘actorness’ in Europe is
very much a recent phenomenon and almost exclusively economic, which became
most prominent after the outbreak of the global economic crisis and subsequently
the Eurozone crisis. China has emerged as a very visible economic actor and, as
described above, has engaged in extensive economic activities that have led to a
Europe wary of China’s presence and power in the region (Meunier et al, 2014;
Godement and Parello-Plesner, 2011; Hanemann, 2014). Given the marked
differences in these two bilateral relations in terms of their past and present
trajectories, this hypothesis reflects the expectation that there is no significant
correlation between European views toward China and toward the United States.

584
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Research Design
To test the three hypotheses, we utilize for our analysis data from the 2010
Transatlantic Trends, an annual survey of public opinion in the United States,
Turkey, and 11 European Union countries. The survey evaluates the state of
transatlantic relations through personal interviews, in which respondents provide
their views on the U.S. and the EU as well as global threats, foreign policy
objectives, world leadership, and multilateral institutions. They survey is unique in
the sense that it focuses on a wide range of foreign policy issues, ranging from
political economy to security concerns. Our analysis examines the pattern of
responses regarding U.S. leadership in the world and in world economic affairs and
the extent to which they may be associated with corresponding respondent views
about the rise of China. This survey allows us to go beyond the popular ‘favorable
or unfavorable‘ attitudes toward a given country. The batteries of nuanced
questions on China and the U.S. in the survey are able to give us a more
sophisticated view of how Europeans view these two powers, and we are able to
distinguish between them as military or economic actors, among other equally
important facets of international power.
The sample of analysis includes the 11 European Union member countries from
Transatlantic Trends. The countries covered by the survey – Bulgaria, France,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, and
the United Kingdom – represent the diversity of the European Union very well. It
includes all the largest economies and military powers as well as some smaller
countries. The group also contains countries from the ‘‘old’’ and ‘‘new’’ Europe.
Dependent Variables: Respondent Views on U.S. Leadership
To operationalize the public’s attitude toward the U.S., our dependent variable, we
utilize data from individual survey responses to two questions about the United
States and its leadership in international politics, broadly conceived, and another
question on the desirability of U.S. leadership in the global economy.5 The
questions include i) ‘‘How desirable is it that the United States exert strong
leadership in world affairs (question 1); and ii) ‘‘How desirable is it that the United
States exert strong leadership in world economic affairs (question 2)’’? For each
question, respondents chose from the following five responses: i) very desirable; ii)
somewhat desirable; iii) somewhat undesirable; iv) very undesirable.6
Independent Variables: Views on China
The independent variables of interest are respondent views on China and how
respondents view China’s role in the global economy. The first question is
 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1472-4790
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formulated to measure the respondent’s overall view of China: ‘‘… please tell me if
you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very
unfavorable opinion of China.’’7 As the question itself indicates, respondents chose
among four responses: i) very favorable, ii) somewhat favorable, iii) somewhat
unfavorable, and iv) very unfavorable. The second question, and the major
independent variable of interest in the multivariate analysis, gauges respondent
views on China’s economic role: ‘‘There are different views about the rise of
China. In economic terms, some people see China as more of an opportunity for
new markets and investment, while others see it as a threat to our jobs and
economic security. Which view is closer to your own?’’ Respondents may choose
either China as an ‘‘economic opportunity,’’ ‘‘economic threat,’’ ‘‘both,’’ or
‘‘neither’’.
Bivariate Analysis
Our baseline analysis examines bivariate associations between responses to
questions about China and about U.S. leadership, aggregated at the national level
for the 11 European countries. The results are presented in Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4.
They illustrate Europe-wide patterns in public opinion on China and on U.S.
leadership. Tables 1 and 2 show the pattern of ‘‘favorable’’ and ‘‘unfavorable’’
views of China, tabulated against individuals’ views of U.S. leadership in world
affairs and in global economic affairs. We separate responses regarding U.S.
leadership more broadly in international politics from leadership in the global
economy, and the responses are consistent across the two questions. As the
Tables show, European public opinion is generally support of U.S. leadership, with
about 57% of the responses in the ‘‘desirable categories’’ (3232 of 5662) for U.S.
leadership and similarly (58%) for U.S. leadership in the global economy (3239 of
5629). Tables 1 and 2 show general attitudinal patterns regarding the relationship
between views of China and U.S. leadership. Tables 3 and 4 delve deeper into the
relationship between sentiments toward China and toward the U.S. by focusing on
the economic role of China as an economic ‘‘opportunity’’ or ‘‘threat.’’
The major patterns that emerge from these bivariate associations, all of which are
also statistically significant, indicate strong support for the positive correlation
hypothesis. First, favorable sentiments toward China and toward the United States
largely move together. That is, respondents who view U.S. leadership as
‘‘desirable,’’ whether in world affairs or world economic affairs, also have a
‘‘favorable’’ view of China. In Table 1, for example, among those respondents who
find U.S. leadership in world affairs as ‘‘very desirable’’ or ‘‘somewhat desirable,’’
over half of the respondents in both categories also have a ‘‘very favorable’’ or
‘‘somewhat favorable’’ view of China (approximately 57% and 52%, respectively).
Most of the observations are concentrated, however, in the moderate response
categories for views on China. For all responses to U.S. leadership questions, at
586
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Table 1: Views of China and U.S. leadership in world affairs*
View of China

Very favorable
Somewhat favorable
Somewhat
unfavorable
Very unfavorable
Total

Desirability of U.S. leadership
Very desirable

Somewhat
desirable

142 (14.14%)
435 (43.33%)
295 (29.38%)

145 (6.51%)
1,007 (45.20%)
876 (39.32%)

132 (13.15%)
1,004 (100.00%)

200 (8.98%)
2,228 (100%)

Somewhat
undesirable

Very
undesirable

73 (4.66%)
632 (40.36%)
667 (42.59%)

91 (11.04%)
300 (36.41%)
274 (33.25%)

194 (12.39%)
1,566 (100%)

159 (19.30%)
824 (100%)

*Number of respondents: 5,622, Pearson v2(9) = 185.70 (Pr = 0.000).

Table 2: Views of China and U.S. leadership in world economic affairs*
View of China

Desirability of U.S. leadership
Very desirable

Very favorable
Somewhat favorable
Somewhat unfavorable
Very unfavorable
Total

161
411
299
132
1,003

(16.05%)
(40.98%)
(29.81%)
(13.16%)
(100.00%)

Somewhat
desirable
157
1,029
848
202
2,236

(7.02%)
(46.02%)
(37.92%)
(9.03%)
(100%)

Somewhat
undesirable
67
601
664
192
1,524

(4.40)
(39.44%)
(43.57%)
(12.60%)
(100%)

Very
undesirable
85
311
289
181
866

(9.82)
(35.91%)
(33.37%)
(20.90%)
(100%)

*Number of respondents: 5,629, Pearson v2(9) = 231.00 (Pr = 0.000).

least 70% of those surveyed held either a ‘‘somewhat favorable’’ or ‘‘somewhat
unfavorable’’ view of China. This pattern was more pronounced for those who
viewed U.S. leadership as ‘‘somewhat undesirable’’ or ‘‘very undesirable.’’
The pattern of positive correlation, where both U.S. leadership and China are
viewed favorably, is less evident in the case of European public views on China’s
economic role as an economic ‘‘opportunity’’ or ‘‘threat.’’ As Table 3 illustrates,
among the respondents who find U.S. leadership in world affairs to be ‘‘very
desirable’’ or ‘‘somewhat desirable,’’ responses are relatively equally distributed
between those who see China as an economic opportunity versus China as an
economic threat, suggesting in this case that there is no clear association between
sentiments toward the U.S. and toward China when it comes to perceptions of the
latter’s role as an economic actor in Europe.
Second, we also find a very interesting positive correlation that concerns
negative sentiments. As Tables 3 and 4 show, negative views, whether toward U.S.
leadership or toward China, move in tandem, and it is here that we find the
strongest support for the positive correlation hypothesis. Among respondents who
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Table 3: China’s economic role and U.S. leadership in world affairs*
China’s
economic role

Desirability of U.S. leadership
Very desirable

Opportunity
Threat
Both
Neither
Total

442
470
97
18
1,027

(43.04%)
(45.76%)
(9.44%)
(1.75%)
(100.00%)

Somewhat
desirable
1,019
1,026
212
67
2,324

(43.85%)
(44.15%)
(9.12%)
(2.88%)
(100%)

Somewhat
undesirable
546
872
155
64
1,637

(33.35%)
(53.27%)
(9.47%)
(3.91%)
(100%)

Very
undesirable
249
456
94
44
843

(29.54%)
(54.09%0
(11.15%)
(5.22%)
(100%)

*Number of respondents: 5,831, Pearson v2(9) = 97.68 (Pr = 0.000).

Table 4: China’s economic role and U.S. leadership in world economic affairs*
China’s
economic role

Desirability of U.S. leadership
Very desirable

Opportunity
Threat
Both
Neither
Total

457
450
101
22
1,030

(44.37%)
(43.69%)
(9.81%)
(2.14%)
(100.00%)

Somewhat
desirable
966
1,069
228
61
2,324

(41.57%)
(46.00%)
(9.81%)
(2.62%)
(100%)

Somewhat
undesirable
531
818
176
62
1,587

(33.46%)
(51.54%)
(11.09%)
(3.91%)
(100%)

Very
undesirable
254
493
112
37
896

(28.35%)
(55.02%)
(12.50%)
(4.13%)
(100%)

*Number of respondents: 5,837, Pearson v2(9) = 84.84 (Pr = 0.000).

find U.S. leadership ‘‘somewhat undesirable’’ or ‘‘very undesirable,’’ over half the
respondents in each category also view China as an economic ‘‘threat’’ much more
than an economic ‘‘opportunity.’’ The results are consistent across both Tables 3
and 4, which examines views on China’s economic role vis-à-vis views on U.S.
leadership in world affairs and in the global economy. In offering our interpretation
of these results in the following section, we develop the argument that these
negative sentiments may well be proxies for sentiments about hegemony and
globalization more broadly.
Underlying these macrolevel patterns that aggregate across these European
countries are significant country-level differences in attitudes toward China and
toward the U.S. Table 5 presents the survey results broken down by country. In
terms of views of China as an economic opportunity or threat, France has the
highest percentage of respondents (72.56%) who see China as an economic
‘‘threat,’’ while the Netherlands, in contrast, has the highest percentage (73.34%) of
respondents who see China as an economic ‘‘opportunity.’’
Tables 6 and 7 show the cross-tabulations of views of China vis-à-vis views of
U.S. leadership for two key actors in Europe: Germany and France. Public opinion
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Table 5: China as economic opportunity or economic threat? country views
Country

Opportunity

Netherlands
Romania
United Kingdom
Germany
Bulgaria
Spain
Italy
Slovakia
Portugal
Poland
France

641
460
539
496
319
368
294
198
288
240
239

Threat

(73.34%)
(63.27%)
(57.34%)
(53.80%)
(47.47%)
(38.61%)
(33.87%)
(33.85%)
(31.00%)
(29.02%)
(27.44%)

233
267
401
426
353
585
574
387
641
587
632

Totals

(26.66%)
(36.73%)
(42.66%)
(46.20%)
(52.53%)
(61.39%)
(66.13%)
(66.15%)
(69.00%)
(70.98%)
(72.56%)

874
727
940
922
672
953
868
585
929
827
871

Table 6: China’s economic role and U.S. leadership in world affairs: Germany*
China’s
economic role

Desirability of U.S. leadership
Very
desirable

Opportunity
Threat
Both
Neither
Total

23
14
3
0
40

(57.50%)
(35.00%)
(7.50%)
(0.00%)
(100.00%)

Somewhat
desirable
142
94
16
5
257

(55.25%)
(36.58%)
(6.23%)
(1.95%)
(100%)

Somewhat
undesirable
71
85
6
3
165

(43.03%)
(51.52%)
(3.64%)
(1.82%)
(100%)

Very
undesirable
14
12
1
1
28

(50.00%)
(42.86%)
(3.57%)
(3.57%)
(100%)

*Number of respondents: 490 Pearson v2(9) = 12.16 (Pr = 0.205).

regarding U.S. leadership and China diverge dramatically in the two countries.
Respondents in Germany strongly support U.S. leadership in world affairs as
desirable, while public opinion in France, although generally favorable toward the
U.S., is more divided on the question of U.S. leadership. In terms of views of China
and of U.S. leadership together, Table 6 shows that in Germany, individuals who
express a favorable (‘‘very desirable’’ or ‘‘somewhat desirable’’) view of U.S.
leadership of world affairs also view China more as an economic opportunity
(57.5% and 55.25%, respectively) than a threat (35% and 36.58%, respectively).
Similarly, among respondents that view U.S. leadership as ‘‘somewhat undesirable’’ or ‘‘very undesirable,’’ more respondents also see China more as an
economic threat (51.52% and 42.86%, respectively) than an opportunity (43.03%
and 50%, respectively%). Germany is thus a good illustration of the Europe-wide
pattern of views of U.S. leadership and of China that largely move in tandem.
France exhibits a dramatically different pattern, in which a strong anti-China
sentiment is apparent. Though the public is more divided than in Germany on
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Table 7: China’s economic role and U.S. leadership in world affairs: France*
China’s
economic role

Desirability of U.S. leadership
Very
desirable

Opportunity
Threat
Both
Neither
Total

15
21
6
1
43

(34.88%)
(48.84%)
(13.95%)
(2.33%)
(100.00%)

Somewhat
desirable
47
110
24
5
186

(25.27%)
(59.14%)
(12.90%)
(2.69%)
(100%)

Somewhat
undesirable
37
118
13
3
171

(21.64%)
(69.01%)
(7.60%)
(1.75%)
(100%)

Very
undesirable
21
48
7
4
80

(26.25%)
(60.00%)
(8.75%)
(5.00%)
(100%)

*Number of respondents: 480, Pearson v2(9) = 10.65 (Pr = 0.301).

whether U.S. leadership in world affairs is desirable or undesirable, respondent views
of China are consistently negative in France. Respondents consistently viewed China
as an economic threat, irrespective of views of U.S. leadership. Among respondents
with a favorable view (‘‘very desirable’’ or ‘‘somewhat desirable’’) of U.S.
leadership, 47.84% and 59.14%, respectively, see China as an economic threat.
This trend is even more pronounced among those who view U.S. leadership in world
affairs as ‘‘somewhat undesirable’’ or ‘‘very undesirable,’’ with 69.01% and 60%, of
respondents, respectively, viewing China as an economic threat.
Multiple Regression Analysis
Building on the results of the bivariate analyses above, we conduct multiple
regression analyses controlling for a host of additional explanatory factors. The
dependent variable is sentiment toward U.S. leadership in world affairs, measured
as an ordinal variable with four levels indicating the extent to which the respondent
views U.S. leadership in world affairs or world economic affairs in a positive light:
‘very desirable,’ ‘somewhat desirable,’ ‘somewhat undesirable,’ and ‘very
undesirable.’ Given the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, the analysis
employs ordered logistic regression to model the level of positive sentiment for
U.S. leadership.
The independent variables of interest are the responses to questions on i)
un/favorable view toward China and ii) view of China as economic opportunity/
threat. For respondents’ views of China, responses ‘somewhat favorable,’ ‘somewhat
unfavorable’ and ‘very unfavorable’ were constructed as dummy variables, with the
base category being the ‘very favorable’ view of China. For the question on China as i)
economic opportunity or ii) threat, these were also constructed as dummy variables,
with the response ‘neither’ or ‘both’ together forming the base category. Our
motivation in constructing these responses as dummy variables, as opposed to
collapsing these variables into fewer categories for simplicity, was to exploit as much
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as possible the information on the level of sentiment provided by the survey
responses.
Control Variables
In the multivariate analysis, we control for a host of factors that may be correlated
not only with individual views on U.S. leadership but also with respondents’ views
of China. First, the analysis controls for set of socioeconomic and demographic
variables, including gender and age as well as education and employment. We
employ the natural logarithm of age, and education is operationalized as the highest
level of completed education.8 The variable Education is indicated by a 5-point
ordinal scale, with higher values corresponding to higher levels of education: i)
elementary (primary) school or less; ii) some high (secondary); iii) graduation from
high (secondary) school; iv) graduation from college, university or other third-level
institute; and v) post-graduate degree (Masters, PhD) beyond the initial college
degree. Employment is measured as a dichotomous variable, indicating whether the
respondent is employed (0) or unemployed (1).9 We suggest that education and
employment status are also reflective of the respondent’s exposure to globalization,
where lower levels of education and unemployment, in particular, capture greater
risks of economic insecurity arising from open markets (Scheve and Slaughter
2006, Rodrik 1997, 1998). Exposure to globalization, we argue, is correlated with
individual attitudes toward China, the most important emerging market economy,
and toward the U.S., the current leader of the global economy.
Second, we also take advantage of three very important questions posed in the
survey regarding respondents’ views on China, the European Union, and the
perception of common values between these key global actors. We include
responses to these questions also because they are very likely to shape both
respondents’ views on U.S. leadership as well as the major independent variables of
interest concerning views on China. The first of these questions provides a control
for respondent views on support for the European Union, an important and relevant
factor for the sample of analysis. We utilize responses to the following question:
‘‘Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat
unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the European Union?’’ Again, utilizing
the ‘favorable’ response as the base category, the analysis employs dummy
variables to reflect the level of support for the European Union. We expect support
for European integration to shape both sentiments toward China and toward U.S.
leadership, although we are agnostic about the direction of effect in either case. We
take the opportunity of this analysis to investigate the extent to which and the
direction in which support for the EU shapes the public’s views on these leading
actors.
The second question in this battery of controls includes responses to the question
of whether the respondent sees China as a military threat or not.10 We employ the
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response ‘China is a military threat’ as the base category to control for public
perceptions of China in the security realm. We expect that not viewing China as a
military threat is likely to be associated with a generally favorable view of China
and also with the view of China as an economic opportunity (rather than a threat).
At the same time, we expect that not viewing China as a military threat should have
a dampening effect of anti-Americanism, leading respondents to favor U.S.
leadership in international affairs as a different way of expressing sentiment toward
the rise of China.
Finally, the third control variable captures a strong ideational component. We
employ the set of questions about whether EU citizens see enough compatibilities
in the values and/or interests held by EU and Chinese citizens that makes
cooperation in the international arena feasible.11Among the two responses, which
include ‘have enough common values/interests’ and ‘have different values/
interests,’ we employ the former as the base category. We expect that those who
see EU and China as having different values and interests will also have an
unfavorable view of the China and will see the China as more of an economic threat
rather than an opportunity. Moreover, as the bivariate results that show that
sentiments toward China and toward the U.S. appear to be positively correlated in
either direction (favorable or unfavorable), views of different values and interests
between EU and China should also be associated with unfavorable views of U.S.
leadership and, by implication, common values between the EU and China would
be linked to favorable views of U.S. leadership.

Findings and Discussion
We employ ordinal logistic regression to gauge the impact of views on China on
views of U.S. leadership, which is a four-level ordinal variable indicating the
respondent’s degree of support: ‘very desirable,’ ‘somewhat desirable,’ ‘somewhat
undesirable,’ ‘very undesirable.’ The results of the analysis are presented in
Table 8. The first column of results shows the estimates for the model that
examines sentiment toward U.S. leadership, and second column those for the model
for U.S. leadership in world economic affairs. Overall, the multiple regression
analyses controlling for other factors provide further support for the positive
correlation hypothesis that we found in our bivariate analyses. The results generally
show that sentiment toward China is positively associated with sentiment toward
U.S. leadership. Interestingly, this pattern is most prominent in the responses for
the question on U.S. leadership in world economic affairs. This is likely due to the
climate of the global economic crisis at the time, which may have served to
contextualize the survey, frame the questions posed, and sharpen the views
regarding leadership in the global economy. Below we examine the results in
greater detail.
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Table 8: European Views toward U.S. Leadership: Multiple Regression AnalysesTable 8: European
Views toward U.S. Leadership: Multiple Regression Analyses
Dependent variables
Independent variables

Views of China
‘‘Somewhat favorable’’
‘‘Somewhat unfavorable’’
‘‘Very unfavorable’’
China as ‘‘economic opportunity’’
China as ‘‘economic threat’
Views on EU
‘‘Somewhat favorable’’
‘‘Somewhat unfavorable’’
‘‘Very unfavorable’’
‘‘China is not a military threat’’
‘‘EU and China have different values/interests’’
Gender (Female)
Age
Ideology
Education
Employment
cut1
cut2
cut3
Log-likelihood
Chi2 (15)
P\
N

U.S.
Leadership in
world affairs

U.S.
Leadership in world
economic affairs

0.267 (0.210)
0.319 (0.214)
0.743** (0.254)
-0.266 (0.182)
0.116 (0.183)

0.340* (0.169)
0.332 (0.173)
0.580** (0.202)
-0.544** (0.140)
-0.371** (0.137)

0.207 (0.128)
0.602** (0.161)
0.557 (0.290)
0.126 (0.107)
-0.024 (0.105)
0.098 (0.101)
-0.131 (0.141)
-0.196** (0.037)
-0.104* (0.042)
0.147 (0.105)
-2.636** (0.723)
-0.330 (0.719)
1.505* (0.721)
-1,728.977
88.802
0.000
1,439

0.205 (0.106)
0.630** (0.130)
1.600** (0.202)
-0.012 (0.084)
0.188* (0.083)
0.035 (0.080)
-0.412** (0.108)
-0.114** (0.030)
-0.136** (0.032)
-0.026 (0.083)
-3.837** (0.564)
-1.690** (0.560)
-0.237 (0.558)
-2,734.933
182.454
0.000
2,180

*p \ 0.05; **p \ 0.01.

Findings
Impact of Views on China
For the general question regarding the favorableness of views toward China,
responses include ‘very favorable’ (base category in the analysis), ‘somewhat
favorable,’ ‘somewhat unfavorable,’ and ‘very unfavorable.’ The results of the
analysis shows that the response ‘very unfavorable’ is positively associated with
equally unfavorable views U.S. leadership, whether in world affairs or world
economic affairs. Notably, respondents that hold an unfavorable view of China also
tend to see U.S. leadership as ‘undesirable.’ However, there is a slight bifurcation
in the results on views toward U.S. leadership in world affairs: even those who hold
a ‘somewhat favorable’ view of China tend to view U.S. leadership in world
economic affairs as more on the ‘undesirable end.’ It suggests that, at least for the
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international economic arena, anti-American sentiment operates consistently in the
European public, whether or not views toward China are favorable or not.
For the more specific questions regarding China, perceptions of whether the
rising power is an ‘economic opportunity’ or ‘economic threat’ are both associated
with a view of U.S. leadership in world economic affairs that moves away from the
‘undesirable’ direction and veers instead toward the ‘desirable’ end of the
sentiment ordering. Though the more generally worded favorable view question
concerning China appears, as discussed above, to tap into a consistent form of antiAmerican sentiment, questions directed specifically toward the role of China as an
economic actor (‘opportunity’ or ‘threat’) appear, instead, to elicit more clear-cut
responses regarding U.S. leadership in world economic affairs. The results suggest
that, in considering China as a possible contending leader in the world economy,
European citizens may find instead U.S. leadership in the management of
international economic exchange to be more ‘desirable,’ notwithstanding a general
and perhaps preexisting antipathy toward the U.S.’ role in international affairs. This
finding is corroborated by the results for the general U.S. leadership question, in
which estimates for both views of China’s as an economic actor – ‘economic
opportunity’ or ‘economic threat’ – are not statistically significant and appear to
have no discernible impact. The results for the views on China as a ‘military threat’
are also interesting and informative in this regard, as such views have no impact on
any of the questions regarding U.S. leadership. They are indicative of the salience
of the economic dimension in the European public’s views on China and how these
views shape European citizens’ support of U.S. leadership in the international
economy.
Finally, on the question of shared values and interests between the EU and
China, respondents who see more differences on values and interests, relative to
those who see more commonalities, exhibit a divergent pattern in the sentiments
toward the two forms of U.S. leadership. Those who see more differences between
the EU and China on values and interests tend toward more favorable views of U.S.
leadership overall, although this result is not statistically significant. On the other
hand, these same respondents that emphasize differences tend also to view U.S.
leadership in world economic affairs are more undesirable, and this result is
statistically significant. Thus, overall on this normative dimension, as in the case
with the general view question on China, the question appears to tap into a
widespread antipathy toward U.S. and its leadership of the global economy,
although this effect is weak from a statistical standpoint. It contrasts notably with
the more focused questions on the role of China as an economic actor, which
instead elicits more favorable views of U.S. leadership in the global economy. They
suggest perhaps two parallel currents of EU public opinion regarding U.S.
leadership, one that reflects a general antipathy toward U.S. leadership and other a
more favorable view that is elicited by an explicit juxtaposition with the economic
role of China in the global economy.
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Views on EU
As noted above, we took an investigative approach to the effect of views on the EU
as a control variable in the analysis. We posited that such views are likely to have
some effect on views toward U.S. leadership, although we were less definitive on
the direction of the impact. The results of the analysis show that for this question
that contextualizes the broader frame of the EU in shaping views of U.S.
leadership, European citizens who are unfavorably disposed to the EU are also
equally unfavorably disposed to U.S. leadership. This holds more strongly for
leadership of the U.S. in world economic affairs, where the estimates for the
categories denoting ‘unfavorable’ views of the EU are statistically significant. This
result sheds an interesting insight regarding the motivations of anti-Americanism in
Europe, which appear to be positively and strongly associated with antipathy
toward regional integration and a general stance against an internationally oriented
outlook.
Other Controls
The results for the remaining control variables – Gender, Age, Ideology, Education,
and Employment – are interesting in that their impact is slightly more evident in the
question regarding views on U.S. leadership in the world economic affairs, for
which the results for Age, Ideology, and Education are statistically significant.
Concerning the more general question on U.S. leadership, only Education and
Ideology are statistically significant. Their estimates are also negative, which
indicates that the more highly educated individuals and those that are more
conservative on the ideological spectrum also tend to have more favorable views of
U.S. leadership. This result is also consistently prominent in the results for views of
U.S. leadership in world economic affairs. In addition, for views on U.S. leadership
in the economic arena, the estimate for Age is negative and statistically significant,
indicating that older respondents also tend to have more favorable views of the
U.S.. The results of the analysis also show that Gender and Employment are not
associated with views on U.S. leadership, whether general or in world economic
affairs. The estimate for Gender, although the effect is positive indicating that
female respondents tend to have more unfavorable views of U.S. leadership, is not
statistically significant. As for Employment, the results diverge for U.S. leadership
questions, tending toward unfavorable views in the general question but toward
more favorable views on U.S. leadership in world economic affairs. However, these
results are not statistically significant. Overall, the results for these variables
indicate that there is no significant ‘‘gender gap’’ present in anti-American
sentiment in Europe. Similarly, those who are unemployed are neither more nor
less likely to have a negative view of U.S. leadership.
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Discussion
Overall, the analysis demonstrates general support for the positive correlation
hypothesis and indicates the presence of a strong current of public opinion that sees
both the United States and China as hegemons and as rivals of Europe in the current
global economy. They also suggest that respondents, in perceiving both the standing
power – the United States – and the rising power – China – may well see them
inseparably as representing globalization itself. The strong positive association in the
hostile attitudes toward both actors, as illustrated in the bivariate analysis and in large
part corroborated by the multiple regression analysis, may capture the degree of ‘‘antiglobalization’’ in the population at large, opposition to globalization that manifests
itself in strong sentiments against the current two leaders.
The findings of the analyses, which demonstrate a consistent anti-American sentiment
in the European public, suggest that a real line of cleavage exists in Europe today
between individuals who favor an ‘‘outward-looking’’ society and those who favor an
‘‘inward-looking’’ society. The proponents of openness, who might also be called the
‘‘Cosmopolitans’’, are confident about their place in the world, focus on the positive
benefits brought about by globalization, and do not worry that their national sovereignty
is being attacked, neither by European integration nor by existing or rising hegemons. By
contrast, the proponents of a closed society, who might also be called the ‘‘Protectionists’’, feel threatened by globalization, both in its economic and cultural dimensions, and
worry that outsiders (e.g. big countries, the European Union, immigrants, etc.) challenge
their welfare and prospects. Their worries fuel populist parties.
Education is an important factor in this interpretation, as it serves as a proxy for
individual attitudes toward globalization more broadly. The multiple regression
analysis shows that more educated respondents are less likely to exhibit anti-American
sentiments and, by extension, less likely to be hostile toward China as well, given the
positive correlation between views toward the United States and toward China. In the
context of public attitudes toward globalization, the more educated the people are, the
less likely they are to fear China because their job is less directly at stake for now.
On the other hand, more educated individuals may also be more likely to be aware
and concerned about human rights violations in China. Indeed, the issue of human
rights is usually the most common explanation of why Europe is the region of the world
with the most negative public attitudes toward China. Europeans may focus on their
differences in political values with China, more so than Americans who may admire
China as an entrepreneurial and successfully business-minded country. The Dalai
Lama is a well-known political figure in Europe, and many European leaders have met
with him prominently. But this focus on human rights may well be an excuse masking
the real European fears about China, which are primarily economic. Indeed, Table 5
above shows, when it comes to the growing economic power of China, public opinion in
many European countries sees this development as more of a threat than an opportunity.
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Conclusions
This article utilized data from the 2010 Transatlantic Trends survey to analyze the
extent to which public opinion in Europe toward the United States is becoming more
driven by attitudes toward China. We found that a positive correlation holds in
attitudes toward China and toward the United States. This pattern is especially
prominent where survey respondents had more negative attitudes toward the United
States. Such individuals were relatively equally likely also to exhibit similarly
negative attitudes toward China, by having either an unfavorable view of this rising
power or looking upon China as an economic threat. In substantive terms, the results
of this study indicate that where anti-Americanism is strong, anti-Chinese sentiment
is also strong. That is, if one (dis)likes one of these actors, it also (dis)likes the other.
Surprisingly, we did not find evidence for the ‘‘yin and yank’’ hypothesis,
whereby individuals substitute their negative feelings from the U.S. to China.
However, the patterns we found may be transitory and may change over time, as
China becomes an even more prevalent economic actor and the presence of
Chinese investment increasingly visible in Europe.
Further research should look more into country-level differences or focus on
regional differences of opinions between Western and Eastern Europe, the North and
South, or those countries that were hit the hardest by the economic crisis. While
attitudes toward the U.S. are mostly positive in Europe nowadays (although this could
change after the 2016 American presidential election), there are indeed important
variations when it comes to attitudes toward China, although these have grown more
positive in the years since 2010 (Meunier, 2014). Further research should also
investigate the temporal dimension of these attitudes, extending the analysis over time
by utilizing past and subsequent surveys with similar questions. Upcoming surveys
may also provide important new information about the extent of China’s actual
involvement in the European economy in the wake of the Eurozone crisis. These
surveys will capture the impact of the massive Chinese investment that has happened
in some European countries in the wake of their sovereign debt crisis, possibly splitting
Europe into those who see China as a savior and those who see China as a predator.
Future research into EU public opinion about U.S. leadership, and the role of China in
the European and global economies, would benefit greatly from examining this critical
new development of the expansion of Chinese overseas investment.
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Notes
1 Transatlantic Trends is a comprehensive annual survey of American and European public opinion on
foreign policy issues. The data used in this paper are based on polling conducted by TNS Opinion
between June 1 and 29, 2010, in the United States, Turkey, and 11 European Union member
countries: Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia,
Spain, and the United Kingdom. More detailed Methodology in Appendix A.
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2 The data used in this paper are publicly available and accessible through the Inter-university
Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan and the Roper Center.
3 China became a net investor worldwide, and in some European countries in particular, in 2014.
4 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging us to consider the broader political,
historical, and cultural contexts of our hypotheses and ground them in different and important
substantive debates.
5 The analyses presented in this paper utilize unweighted data from the Transatlantic Trends survey
unless otherwise noted.
6 The ambivalent response ‘‘neither or both equally,’’ which does not provide clear information on the
respondent’s sentiment toward U.S. leadership and comprised a small proportion of cases (less than
3%), was set to missing for the questions on U.S. leadership in world affairs and world economic
affairs. The ‘‘don’t know’’ response was also set to missing, for all questions that have this response
category.
7 This battery of questions asks for respondents’ views of China as well as Russia and India, and also
Turkey.
8 Question D3: ‘‘At what stage did you complete your full-time studies?’’ ‘‘Don’t know’’ responses
were set to missing.
9 The analysis employs responses to a question about the respondent’s type of employment, namely
whether he/she is self-employed, an employee or a manual worker. Responses were converted to a
dichotomous indicator for employment/unemployment.
10 Q23. There are also different views about China’s military power. Some people see China as a
military threat, while others do not. Which view is closer to your own?
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

China is a military threat
China is not a military threat
Don’t know (set to missing)
Refused to answer (set to missing)

11 Q24_2. ‘Some people say that China and the EU have enough common values/interests to be able to
cooperate on international problems. Other people say that China and the EU have such different
values/interests that cooperating on international problems is impossible. Which view is closer to
your own?
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Have enough common values/interests
Have different values/interests
Don’t know (set to missing)
Refuse to answer (set to missing)
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Appendix
Methodology
Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviews (except in Poland, Slovakia, Turkey,
Bulgaria, and Romania where face-to-face interviews were conducted due to the
low telephone penetration rate in these five countries). The basic sample design
applied in all countries was multistage random (probability). In each household, the
respondent was drawn at random (following the ‘‘closest birthday rule’’ or Kish
grid). Up to five call-backs for telephone interviews and four visits in total for faceto-face interviews were attempted before dropping a potential respondent.
The U.S. survey fieldwork was carried out by a new survey organization in 2010.
This resulted in some changes in trend data due to different interviewing protocols
used by the new survey organization, a phenomenon called ‘‘house effect.’’
Specifically, the results showed a drop in the number of ‘‘don’t know’’ responses.
For this reason, some of the questions were asked again from a representative
sample of 456 Americans between July 29, 2010 and August 4, 2010. This time,
interviewers were retrained to be more in line with previous year’s protocols. For
questions Q1b_1, Q11, Q25b, and Q26, the results of the new survey were reported
after a careful comparison of the data from the two surveys.
For results based on the national samples in each of the 13 countries surveyed,
one can say with 95% confidence that the margin of error attributable to sampling
and other random effects is plus or minus three percentage points. For results based
on the total European sample, the margin of error is plus or minus one percentage
point. In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in
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Table A1: Detailed methodology
Country

Mode

Field
Period

Representative

Sample
Design

Sample
Size

Geographic NonCoverage

France

Computer
Assisted
Telephone
Interview

June
2–16,
2010

Adults 18 and
older with
access to
landline
telephone

Random
Digit
Dialing

1000

Germany

Computer
Assisted
Telephone
Interview

June
1–21,
June

Random
Digit
Dialing

1001

Italy

Computer
Assisted
Telephone
Interview

June
3–19,
2010

Random
Digit
Dialing

1001

All areas are
covered

Netherlands

Computer
Assisted
Telephone
Interview

June
7–29,
2010

Random
Digit
Dialing

1000

All areas are
covered

Portugal

Computer
Assisted
Telephone
Interview

June
4–23,
2010

Random
Digit
Dialing

1000

Açores and
Madeira
(Portuguese
islands) are not
included

Spain

Computer
Assisted
Telephone
Interview

June
4–22,
2010

Random
Digit
Dialing

1003

All areas are
covered

UK

Computer
Assisted
Telephone
Interview

June
2–24,
2010

Random
Digit
Dialing

1000

All mainland UK,
including
Northern Ireland

USA

Computer
Assisted
Telephone
Interview

June
5–23,
2010

Adults 18 and
older with
access to
landline
telephone
Adults 18 and
older with
access to
landline or
mobile
telephone
Adults 18 and
older with
access to
landline
telephone
Adults 18 and
older with
access to
landline or
mobile
telephone
Adults 18 and
older with
access to
landline or
mobile
telephone
Adults 18 and
older with
access to
landline
telephone
Adults 18 and
older with
access to
landline or
mobile
telephone

The overseas
islands/
territories
belonging to
France are
excluded
All areas are
covered

Random
Digit
Dialing

1000

Alaska and Hawaii
are not covered.
This equals
0.6% of the US
population
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Table A1: (Continued)
Country

Mode

Field
Period

Representative

Sample Design

Sample
Size

Geographic
Non-Coverage

Bulgaria

Face-toface
Interview
Face-toface
Interview
Face-toface
Interview
Face-toface
Interview
Face-toface
Interview

June
1–10,
2010
June
1–21,
2010
June
1–21,
2010
June
1–20,
2010
June
1–19,
2010

Adults 18 and
older

Multistage Stratified
Random Sample

1016

All areas are
covered

Adults 18 and
older

Multistage Stratified
Random Sample

1000

All areas are
covered

Adults 18 and
older

Multistage Stratified
Random Sample

1042

All areas are
covered

Adults 18 and
older

Multistage Stratified
Random Sample

1006

All areas are
covered

Adults 18 and
older

Multistage Stratified
Random Sample

1003

All areas are
covered

Poland

Romania

Slovakia

Turkey

conducting surveys can also introduce error or bias into the findings of public
opinion polls.
For all questions, European averages were weighted on the basis of the size of
the adult population in each country to maintain consistency with previous years’
reports. For new questions, the results were also weighted so that the sample
matches certain population characteristics, including age, gender, and education.
Trend Questions: 1_1, 1_2, 1b_1, 1b_2, 4, 6_1, 6_2, 7, 8a, 8b, 9, 10, 11, 13.1,
13.2, 14, 18, 22, 23, 25a, 25b, 26, 27, 32, 33.1, 33.2, 33.3, 33.4, 33.5, 36a, 38, 39
New Questions: 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4,
5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 8c.1, 8c.2, 8c.3, 8c.4, 12, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21.1, 21.2, 21.3, 21.4,
24_1, 24_2, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36b
When processing is complete, data from the survey are deposited with the InterUniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of
Michigan (ICPSR), the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University
of Connecticut, and the GESIS-Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences and are
available to scholars and other interested parties (See Table A1).
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